A dull number buried in the accounts quietly beat almost everything. Is the profit real cash, or just paper?
No growth story, no cheap multiple, no chart of rising prices. Just one accounting question asked of every company: are these profits backed by cash, or by promises? On a decade of Indian data, buying the cash backed earners turned ₹10 lakh into about ₹74 lakh, and did it with unusual consistency.
The idea is almost boringly sensible. A company can report a fat profit while collecting very little actual cash, its earnings propped up by rising receivables and swelling inventory. Sooner or later that gap closes, usually painfully. So the screen ranks every firm by how cash backed its profit is and buys the cleanest. It made about 22% a year against the market's 13.9%, roughly ₹74 lakh from ₹10 lakh, one of the strongest results we have tested, from a signal almost no ordinary investor ever looks at.
Cash backed profits really did keep winning
Sort every stock into ten buckets by earnings quality and the returns climb almost cleanly from the paper heavy names to the cash rich ones. The rank correlation was about −0.95, a genuinely strong sort. The market, it turns out, does not fully see through accounting until later, which is exactly the inefficiency the screen harvests.
It beat the market in every five year window
One backtest is one story. We built 258 portfolios from the screen, one for every month you could have started, held one, three and five years, and asked the plainest question there is: how often did cash backed profits actually beat a plain index fund? Consistency is the quiet headline. Pick any month to begin, hold five years, and the strategy beat the index every single time we could measure. Over a single year the ride was wider, eight in ten holds landed between −17% and +116%, the luckiest start up +158%, the unluckiest down −44%. But the longer you held the surer the edge became, the fingerprint of a real, fundamental effect rather than a lucky run.
Steady is not the same as safe
For all its consistency, this was still an equity strategy in small and mid sized companies, and it fell hard when the whole market fell. Take every start date and its worst fall over the following five years: the typical start had to sit through a drop of about 48%, and the unluckiest starts fell about 66% from their peak, against the index's 34%. The edge was reliable over five year spans precisely because you had to live through drops like that to collect it.
The most boring edge we have tested, and one of the best
There is no romance to this strategy. It does not find hidden growth or buy fear at the bottom. It just declines to be fooled by profits that are not really there, and that quiet discipline beat almost every cleverer idea we have tested, more consistently than any of them. The catch, as always, is the drawdown between you and the reward. A famous accounting insight told one story; a decade of Indian data confirmed it. The only way to know whether any such edge is real for the market you invest in is to run it against real history yourself.
So we took it to Krest, and ran it through the whole test.
Free · no account needed
Test before you trust.
Every figure on this page came from a few clicks on Krest. See this exact analysis live and interactive, or point the same test at any strategy you have ever believed.
For education only. Not investment advice or a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any security, strategy, or product. Past performance does not guarantee future results, and all investing carries risk, including the possible loss of capital. Make your own decisions, and consider consulting a SEBI registered investment adviser.
Best effort analysis. Prepared on a best effort basis from historical data and may contain errors, omissions, or assumptions. Shared for information and discussion only, and should be independently verified before you rely on it. Krest accepts no liability for any decision made or loss incurred based on it.
Figures reflect an accruals screen (ranked by total accruals to total assets, positive net profit, market cap above ₹500 cr), reconstructed yearly over the last ten years of Indian data (since June 2016), measured against the Nifty 500 total return index. The accruals anomaly was documented by Richard Sloan (1996). Because this rests on about ten years of data, a longer run of history could change the conclusions.
Krest · mykrest.com